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THE "FIRM OFFER" PROBLEM IN CONSTRUCTION BIDS
AND THE NEED FOR PROMISSORY ESTOPPEL
Bidding in the construction industry has long been the source of
many problems for contractors, lawyers, and judges. Until recently
these problems had received little public attention because of a reluc-
tance among contractors to litigate their differences.1 However, since
1958 the litigation involving construction bids has dramatically in-
creased, and courts and attorneys have with increasing frequency been
faced with the difficulties of reconciling the law with modern busi-
ness practices. To comprehend fully the problems that have arisen, the
construction industry's method of operation must first be analyzed.
THE PROBLEM
There are basically three parties involved when a construction bid
is let: (1) the letting party, who calls for bids on his job; (2) the gen-
eral contractor,2 who makes a bid on the whole project, but who often
does little, if any, of the actual work;' and (3) the subcontractor,4 who
is a specialist in a certain field, e.g. plumbing or tile-setting, and who
bids only on that portion of the whole job. Once a project has been
announced, the subcontractor, either on his own initiative or at the
general contractor's request, prepares an estimate for one or more gen-
eral contractors whom he knows to be interested in the project. The
general, who has received bids from many subs, then evaluates the bids
made by the subs in each field and uses these bids to compute his total
bid.5 The letting party, after receiving bids from all interested gen-
erals, awards the contract to the lowest reputable bidder among the
generals.
From this basic framework a problem emerges. It will be noted that
there is no formal contract at law until the award is made by the letting
1. Schultz, The Firm Offer Puzzle, 19 U. Cm. L. REv. 237, 240 n. 7 (1952). Pro-
fessor Schultz found less than a dozen cases litigated in courts of record between
the period beginning in 1914 and ending in 1952.
2. Hereinafter referred to as "the general."
3. See generally Schultz, supra note 1.
4. Hereinafter referred to as "the sub."
5. The general does not always use the lowest bid. Other criteria, such as the
subcontractor's reputation for reliability, enter into the decision. The same con-




party to the general. Prior to the award, there is no offer or acceptance
secured by a valid consideration. This fact then raises the question as
to what status the bid between the sub and the general occupies.
At common law there are three possibilities, each of which depends
on the particular facts of the case. The offer can be viewed as calling
for a unilateral contractO which is completed by the general's use of
the offer in his bid. A unilateral contract is one that calls for an act
or forbearance rather than a promise in exchange,7 and nothing but
full performance will constitute binding consideration.8 Thus, it is
possible to view the sub's bid as calling for an act, i.e., the use of the
bid. If the bid is used by the general, a unilateral contract is then com-
plete? The act supplies the necessary consideration to make a legally
binding agreement.'0
Another view treats the offer as calling for a return promise; the offer
is held to contemplate a bilateral contract."' The exchange of promises
in a bilateral contract provides the consideration 2 and thus makes the
contract legally binding.'3 If this view is to be applied, there must be
an affirmative acceptance of the sub's bid by the general and a return
promise to give the sub the job, or there is no valid contract.14 Since
it is customary in the construction industry to delay such formal com-
mitments until after the award of the general contract,15 this theory
6. See Baird v. Gimble Bros, 64 F.2d 344 (2d Cir. 1933). See generally Llewellyn,
Our Case Law of Contract: Offer and Acceptance, 11, 48 YAr.a L. REv. 779, 783-789
(1939).
7. RESrATEMENT OF CoNTRAcrS § 12 (1932).
8. Id. at § 75 (1) (a & b).
9. Baird v. Gimble Bros., 64 F.2d 344 (2d Cir. 1933).
10. Id. The decision in Baird v. Gimble Bros. implies that the general's act of using
the bid constitutes full performance.
11. Supra note 7.
12. See generally Llewellyn, supra note 6.
13. RrSrATEMENT oF CoNTRACTS § 75 (1) (c&d).
14. 64 F.2d 344.
15. Schultz, supra note 1 at 262. Professor Schultz conducted a "questionnaire sur-
vey" of 137 general contractors and 275 subcontractors in Indiania during 1951. He




3. a bid bond;
4. some other device;
5. never considered;
6. no response?"
Only twenty of the eighty generals had ever considering using one of the three
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allows the sub to revoke his offer at any time before the contract is
awarded. Thus, the general, who has relied on the sub's bid in making
his own bid, is left with no remedy if he has not formally accepted the
offer and promised something in return.16
The third theory that has been applied to construction cases is com-
monly termed "promissory estoppel." 17 While this doctrine can be
traced back to the English case of Jorden v. Money,'8 its modern articu-
lation is found in the Restatement of Contracts. 9 The comments and il-
lustrations to this section indicate that the doctrine applies only to
gratuitous promises,2 0 and the section has been so interpreted. 2' How-
ever, promissory estoppel has been invoked recently to bind a sub who
withdrew his offer before the general had formally accepted but after
the general had used it in his bid.22 This doctrine requires (1) a clear
and definite offer; (2) a reasonable expectation of substantial reliance
by the promisor; (3) actual, reasonable and substantial reliance by the
promisee; and (4) detriment which can only be avoided by the enforce-
ment of the promise.23 Provided that the general can prove the fore-
going elements, the provisions of this section constitute a means by
which the Courts can bind a sub to his promise even if there is no
binding devices. Forty-six had never considered binding the sub, and twelve made
no response.
16. This is exactly what occurred in Baird v. Gimble Bros., 64 F.2d 344 (2d cir. 1933)
17. Promissory estoppel is not considered a true estoppel. It differs from estoppel
in pais, and, in fact, stands in a class by itself. See generally note, Contracts-Promis-
sory Estoppel, 20 VA. L. Rav. 214, 216 (1933); note Subscriptions-Enforcement of
Charitable Subscriptions, 12 MiNN. L. Rv. 643 (1929); note, Contracts-Revocability
of an Offer to Form a Unilateral Contract-Promissory Estoppel, 13 MIN. L. REv.
366, 367 (1929). While promissory estoppel has been criticized on the grounds that
it is not a true estoppel, no court or writer has produced a better name for the
doctrine.
18. 5 H.L.C. 185 (1854).
19. REsTATEMENT op CoNTRAcrs § 90 provides: "A promise which the promisor should
reasonably expect to induce action or forbearance of a definite and substantial char-
acter on the part of the promisee and which does induce such action or forbearance
is binding if injustice can be avoided only by the enforcement of the promise."
20. Id., illustrations 1-4.
21. 64 F.2d at 346. "But a man may make a promise without expecting an equiva-
lent; a donative promise, conditional or absolute. . . .The doctrine of 'promissory
estoppel' is to avoid the harsh result of allowing the promisor in such a case to
repudiate, when the promisee has acted in reliance upon the promise."
22. E. A. Coronis Assocs. v. M. Gordon Constr. Co., 90 N.J. Super. 69, 216 A.2d
246, 252 (1966); see also Drennan v. Star Paving Co., 51 Cal.2d 409, 333 P.2d 757
(1958).
23. See C.D., 26 M6. L. REv. 356 (1961).
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accepted bilateral or unilateral contract.4 Many courts have been re-
luctant to apply this doctrine. This reluctance can be ascribed to two
sources: (1) the gratuitous promise gloss of the doctrine25 and (2) the
legacy of the Baird decision,26 discussed infra.
Since the adoption of the Uniform Commercial Code by most juris-
dictions,2 7 a new theory may now be available to the courts in a certain
percentage of cases involving construction bids. Section 2-205 thereof
provides:
An offer by a merchant to buy or sell goods in a signed writing
which by its terms gives assurance that it will be held open is not
revocable, for lack of consideration, during the time stated or if
no time is stated for a reasonable time, but in no event may such
period of irrevocability exceed three months....
This section, it should be noted, applies only to written offers,28 and,
unfortunately, a substantial number of subcontractors do not make
either firm or written offers;29 hence, this section is inapplicable in most
instances.
In addition, Section 2-205 applies only to contracts for the sale of
goods. Construction subcontracts commonly involve both goods and
services. For example, a plumbing subcontractor not only contracts to
supply goods but installation of such as well. However, there are a
number of subcontracts which provide only for the furnishing of
goods,30 and consequently, it would be erroneous to assume that the
Uniform Commercial Code has no application in this area. But, in the
final analysis, it must be conceded that the scope of the Code's applica-
bility in this area is potentially small due to the general practice of
including services in subcontracts.31
24. E. A. Coronls Assocs. v. M. Gordon Constr. Co., 90 N.J. Super. 69, 216 A.2d
246 (1966).
25. RESTATFMENT supra at note 19, illustrations 1-4.
26. 64 F.2d at 344.
27. Tim UNIroRMw CoznmmcLAL CoDz has been adopted in all states but Louisiana.
It is also in effect in the District of Columbia and the Virgin Islands. UNIaoFRM
LAws ANNOTATED, UNIFORM COMMERCAL CODE, Art 1-3 (supp. 1967).
28. UNIFORM CoMMmaCAL CODE § 2-205, comment 2.
29. This fact was clearly revealed by Professor Schultz's survey in Indiana. Schultz,
supra note 1.
30. See, Robert Gordon, Inc. v. Ingersoll Rand Co., 117 F.2d 654 (7th Cir. 1941)
and Tatsch v. Hamilton-Erickson Mfg, 76 N.M. 729, 418 P.2d 187 (1966).
31. No jurisdiction has yet decided whether UNIFORM ComMERcLAL CoDe § 2-205
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There is another facet to the construction bid problem. The remedies
discussed above are oriented toward protecting the general if he has
relied on the sub's bid. But the general is not the only one who requires
legal aid; the sub may also need protection. Reliance is a two-way street.
If the sub submits a bid and if informed by the general that his bid is
being used in the overall bid, the sub may rely upon being awarded
the contract. If he is not thereafter awarded the subcontract, he may
have incurred damages; e.g., the accumulation of material in prepara-
tion to perform. Therefore, any legal remedy or solution to the bid
problem must protect the rights of both general and subcontractor. A
remedy that will protect both parties is especially important in view
of the balance of bargaining power between those parties. This power
is in a constant state of flux.
At the time when the sub submits his bid to the general, he is in a
relatively strong position 2 Since the general does not have the con-
tract at this stage and is still competing with other generals, he cannot
force the sub to lower his bid by threatening not to give the sub the
contract. Thus, at this stage, the general is usually forced to rely on
the sub's bid. But once the general has secured the contract, he has a
monopoly on the market. It is in his financial interest to try to reduce
the sub's bid by threatening to give the subcontract to another. The
sub, who needs the work to keep his equipment moving, will usually
surrender even if he can make no profit. This practice is known as "bid
shopping" 3 and results in a windfall profit to the general at the sub's
expense. The practice is so common that certain generals anticipate such
reductions when making their bid 4 and arbitrarily reduce the sub's low
is applicable to an offer for both goods and services. But see E. A. Coronis Assocs. v.
M. Gordon Constr. Co., 90 N.J. Super. 69, 216 A.2d 246 (1966). Therefore, it is unknown
whether the courts will strictly construe this section to apply only to offers for
goods, or whether they will regard the offer as a whole. Should a court take the
latter view, it could interpret an offer for goods and services as one calling pri-
marily for goods rather than services, thereby opening the door for its extended
application.
32. Schultz, supra note 1, at 256-274.
33. The term "bid shopping" is used when the general tries to secure lower bids
from subs. The term "bid peddling" is used when a sub reduces his bid once all
sub bids have been submitted in an effort to get the contract. Both these practices
are condemned as unethical by subcontractor's associations, but they are quite com-
mon in the industry.
34. Most subcontractors will admit that certain unethical generals commonly an-
ticipate these reductions in their overall bid.
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offer by as much as ten percent." Consequently, it is not uncommon
for a sub to submit the low bid, and yet not be awarded the contract.
Ultimately, the sub is the weaker party, and it is apparent that he
needs as much, if not more, legal protection as the general. Therefore,
any legal theory that allows the general to depend on the sub's offer
must be reciprocal, allowing the sub to rely on the subcontract if his
bid is used and if he is notified of its use. In essence, what the construc-
tion industry needs is a legal theory that will provide for a balanced
and equitable relationship between the parties.
LINES OF AUTHORITY
Two divergent lines of authority have emanated from the courts
which have attempted to deal with this problem. The first and oldest
stemmed from the leading case of Baird v. Gimble Brothers, 6 while the
modern view traces its origin to Drennan v. Star Paving.31
The Baird Decision
The Baird decision, despite much criticism,- s has enjoyed remarkable
longevity, although it is dubious whether its following will be enlarged
in the future. The Baird case arose when a sub, who had learned of a
proposed project, sent unsolicited "firm" offers to all generals known
to be interested in the job. After his bid was received and used by the
winning general, Gimble, the sub, discovered an error in his bid and
withdrew the offer immediately by telephone and later by letter. 'The
general, after receiving these withdrawals, formally accepted the sub's
offer and Gimble refused to perform. The court in its decision wrestled
with three basic issues: (1) was there a bilateral contract; (2) was
there a unilateral contract; and (3) even if there was no contract, could
the doctrine of promissory estoppel be invoked to bind the sub?
The resolution of the first issue was not difficult because the offer
had been revoked before there was an acceptance, and thus there could
be no bilateral contract. 9 Even prior to the adoption of the Uniform
35. Schultz, supra note 1. This fact was established during Schultz's interviews with
general contractors.
36. 64 F.2d 344.
37. 51 Cal. 2d 409, 333 P.2d 757 (1958).
38. For criticism of Baird, see generally note, Once Around the Flag Pole-Con-
struction Bidding and Contracts at Formation, 39 N.Y.U. L. REv. 816 (1964); note,
Contracts-Revocation of Offer Before Acceptance-Promissory Estoppel, 28 ILL, .L.
REv. 419 (1934); note, Contracts-Promissory Estoppel, 20 VA. L. Rzv. 214 (1933).
39. RESrATMENT oF Covtmiars S 35.
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Commercial Code, written firm offers, if unsupported by consideration,
were revocable" at any time before acceptance.
The second issue was more troublesome. Its resolution depended en-
tirely on the court's interpretation of the intent of the parties as mani-
fested by their correspondence and action.4' In other words, did the
sub intend to propose a unilateral contract which would be binding
once the general used the sub's bid? If the answer was affirmative,
there would be valid consideration to support the firm offer, and it
would then be irrevocable for the period stated. However, the court
held that reason and the language of the offer precluded this inter-
pretation. Therefore, there was no unilateral contract. As for the final
issue, the court, while it in a-guendo accepted the doctrine of promis-
sory estoppel, held that it was inapplicable because the doctrine was
meant to apply to only donative or gratuitous promises.4 Here the
offer was for an exchange and was not a gratuitous promise. In effect,
then, the court held that there was no enforceable contractual relation-
ship between the parties, and consequently the general had no legal
remedy against the sub.
The first two issues were decided strictly on the specific facts of this
case. Though the court's interpretation of certain facts may be criti-
cized, its legal basis was sound. The third issue, however, raised a ques-
tion of law: What are the limits of the doctrine of promissory estoppel's
applicability? The court in Baird chose to take the narrow view and
construed the doctrine as being applicable only to gratuitous promises.
This result was undoubtedly based on a careful reading of the illustra-
tions found in the Restatement," and the decision in Allegheny Col-
lege v. National Bank45 which also exerted an influence on this issue. 6
However, it was not long before the narrow interpretation of the
promissory estoppel doctrine was questioned,47 and even subsequent
cases, which cited Baird in support, chose to avoid the issue of promis-
40. Id. at S 47.
41. The offer stated "we are offering these price for reasonable [sic] prompt ac-
ceptance after the general contract has been awarded." The court construed this to
mean that the offer contemplated a return promise, a bilateral contract. 64 F.2d at
346.
42. Id.
43. Id. See also supra note 21.
44. 64 F.2d 344.
45. 246 N.Y. 369, 159 N.. 173 (1927).
46. Baird v. Gimble Bros., 64 F.2d 344, 346.
47. Robert Gordon, Inc. v. Ingersoll Rand Co., 117 F.2d 654; Northwestern Eng'r
Co. v. Ellerman, 69 S.D. 397, 10 N.W.2d 879 (1943).
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sory estoppel.4 8 In fact, no court directly supported the Baird rule on
the Restatement's applicability.
The Drennan Decision
In 1958 the leading case of Drennan v. Star Paging Co.49 squarely
challenged the Baird holding on promissory estoppel. In the Drennan
case, the general had used the sub's oral bid which was communicated
to the general's secretary by telephone. This bid did not purport to
be a firm offer as had the sub's bid in the Baird case. The sub had also
revoked prior to acceptance; thus there could be no valid bilateral con-
tract.
While the facts favored the sub in both Drennan and Baird, there was
a material difference in the relative weight of the equities in the two
cases. In Baird, the general had not listed his subcontractors and there-
fore had not committed himself to any one sub. The court did not
sympathize with the general and left the parties as it found them5°
In Drennan, however, the general had listed all the subcontractors
whose bids he had used. The practical effect of this listing was the
foreclosure of the general's ability to "shop" after the award. Thus, the
court in Drennan sympathized with the general and not with the sub.
The court held that the sub "... . had reasons not only to expect plaintiff
the general to rely on its bid but to want him to." The court reasoned
further that though the sub's bid was silent on revocability, this silence
must be interpreted with reference to the facts. Since it was clear that
the defendant wanted the general to use the bid and rely on it, the
court held that the Restatement applied. This decision challenged the
Baird rule on two grounds: (1) on the analysis of the sub-general re-
lationship and (2) on the applicability of promissory estoppel. It should
be noted, however, that (1) the Drennan result was based on a par-
ticular set of equities, and that (2) the court cautioned that had the
48. Albert v. R. P. Farnsworth & Co., 176 F.2d 198 (5th Cir. 1949); Traff v.
Fabro, 337 I1. App. 83, 84 NE.2d 874 (1949); Am. Handkerchief Corp. v.
Frannat Realty, 17 NJ. 12, 109 A.2d 793 (1954); Harris v. Lillis, 24 So. 2d 689 (Miss.
1946); R. J. Daum Constr. Co. v. Child, 122 Utah, 194, 247 P.2d 817 (1952); Milone &
Tucci, Inc. v. Bonafide Builders, 49 Wyo. 2d 363, 301 P.2d 759 (1956).
49. 51 Cal. 2d 409, 333 P.2d 757.
50. 64 F.2d at 346. The Baird court noted that the general had a means by which
he could have bound the sub. One can infer that the court felt that the general
wished to shop around otherwise he would have sought to bind the sub. See Schultz,
supra note 1 at 247-252.
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sub's bid been specifically revocable the opposite result would have
been reached.1-
RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
Only one court, it is interesting to note, has explicitly rejected the
Drennan holding on promissory estoppel,5 2 and it would appear that
this decision was due to a peculiar legal situation existing in Florida. 3
While some other courts have reached different results, none has ques-
tioned the basic Drennan hypothesis that promissory estoppel applies
where equity so demands.
In 1960, a Kansas court considered a case54 in which a general sought
to recover from a sub for non-performance. The sub had limited his
firm offer to ten days, and the general had not accepted during that
period. The court held that the Drennan rule did not apply here since
it was clear that the offer had expired before acceptance was communi-
cated.5 Another case,56 which was decided in favor of the defendant
sub, arose in Washington, D. C., in 1963. In this instance, the sub's oral
bid seemed too low, and the general asked the sub to reconsider it.
The sub did so, but retained his original figure. The general notified
the sub that he was using the sub's bid, and later, when awarded the
general contract, he sent the sub a proposed contract which contained
many different terms. The court held that no contractual relationship
arose by virtue of the mere use of the sub's offer.5 Furthermore, the
51. 51 Cal. 2d 409, 333 P.2d 757.
52. Southeastern Sales & Service Co. v. T. T. Watson, Inc., 172 So.2d 153 (Fla.
App. 1962). In this case, brought in the Florida District Court of Appeals, the court
reviewed both the Baird and Drennan views. The general solicited the sub's bid,
which was abnormally low. The general asked the sub if his bid contained everything
called for in the specifications, and when the sub responded affirmatively, the gen-
eral used the sub's bid in his computations. The sub then discovered an error and
withdrew his bid. The court adopted Baird's strict approach, considering a uni-
lateral contract, a bilateral contract and promissory estoppel. It held that none of
these theories applied and that there was no enforceable contract. The court also
said that the sub's bid was so obviously incorrect as to put the general on notice;
therefore, he should have sought relief from his own bid instead of attempting to
hold the sub to his offer.
53. There is precedent in Florida for granting equitable relief from a bid contain-
ing a unilateral mistake. See Board of Control v. Clutter Constr. Corp., 139 So.2d 153
(Fla. App. 1962).
54. Sharp Bros. Contract Co. v. Commercial Restoration, 334 SV.2d 248 (Kan.
1960).
55. id. at 253.
56. N. Litterio & Co. v. Glassman Constr. Co., 319 F.2d 736 (D.C. Cir. 1963).
57. Id. at 739.
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court went on to say, a reply to an offer cannot add conditions not
present in the offer. If the purported acceptance does add such condi-
tions it is a counter-offer and not an acceptance. 58 The court here did
not reject the Drennan rule on promissory estoppel, but in fact seemed
to favor this rule. 9 The court held that the general was not entitled
to summary judgment on the basis of the Restatement because estoppel
is a question of fact, which must be considered at trial.00 Air Tech-
nology Corp. v. General Electric Co.61 is another instructive case in
point. Here the sub was told he was "a member of the team" when his
bid was used. Subsequently, the general got the contract and refused
to give the sub the job, whereupon the sub sued. The court held for
the sub on the grounds that the general was unjustly enriched and that
he had violated a duty owed to the sub. There was no mention of
promissory estoppel or of the Restatement, but the result is in keeping
with the Drennan decision in that it turned on a violation of a duty
owed. Another 1965 case 02 rejected Baird and applied the Drennan rule,
binding a sub who sought to withdraw after he discovered a mistake.
The court said "justice demands that the loss resulting from the sub-
contractor's carelessness should fall upon him who was guilty of the
error rather than upon the principal contractor who relied in good faith
upon the offer that he received." 63 A Utah court reached the opposite
result in a case having similar facts.64 In this instance, it appeared that
the sub was misled by the general's representations, and that his mistake
was obvious on the face of the bid. The court held that promissory
estoppel is a doctrine of equity, the benefit of which the plaintiff can
claim only by showing facts which justify its application. 5
In C. H. Leavell and Co. v. Grafe and Associates, Inc.,65 the general
solicited the sub's bid, which was later orally reduced, and both parties
entered into an oral "lock in" agreement. The general, who won the
contract using the sub's bid, asked the sub to confirm in writing the
reduction. He also requested that the sub confirm the posting of a
58. RESTATEMENT OF CoImrAcTs § 60. See also Heddon v. Lupinsky, 405 Pa. 609, 176
A.2d 406 (1962).
59. N. Litterio & Co. v. Glassman Constr. Co., 319 F.2d at 738-739.
60. Id. at 740. See also E. A. Coronis Assocs. v. M. Gordon Constr. Co., 90 N.J.
Super 69, 75, 216 A.2d 246, 252.
61. 347 Mass. 613, 199 NZE.2d 538 (1964).
62. Reynolds v. Texarkana Constr. Co., 237 Ark. 583, 374 S.W.2d 818 (1964).
63. Id. at 820.
64. Union Tank Car Co. v. Wheat Bros., 15 Utah 2d 101, 387 P.2d 1000 (1964).
65. Id. at 1003.
66. 90 Idaho 502, 414 P.2d 873 (1966).
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performance bond. Since there had been no previous agreement regard-
ing this bond, the sub refused to post it. The court held that no binding
contract had been reached because each party had been making offers
and counter offers. While rejecting the applicability of promissory
estoppel to this set of facts, 67 the court supported the doctrine in princi-
ple.6
8
The Supreme Court of New Mexico held in Tatsch v. Hamilton-Erickson Mfg.t" that the sub's offer, used in the general's bid, to supply
equipment not conforming to the specifications did not bind the sub to
provide equipment meeting these specifications. The court further stated
that the general's acceptance should have been clear and defined and
should have conformd to the sub's offer in order to justify the applica-
tion of promissory estoppel. It was decided that there was no such
acceptance in this case, and thus, there could be no reliance upon the
sub's bid. Promissory estoppel was not applied here, but its validity was
not questioned.
The most recent case directly in point is E. A. Coronis Assocs. v. M.
Gorden Constr. Co.70 in which the New Jersey Superior Court con-
sidered both the applicability of the Uniform Commercial Code and
promissory estoppel. Here the general contractor relied on a letter con-
taining the sub's bid for erecting structural steel. The general won the
contract, and then the sub revoked; but the general had never accepted
his offer. The court first rejected the argument of the Uniform Com-
mercial Code, holding that the sub's letter was not a "signed writing
which by its terms gives assurance that it (the offer) will be held
open," 17 and thereby avoided deciding whether the letter dealt with
goods. Turning then to the question of promissory estoppel, the court
reviewed the authority and concluded that the better line of decisions
applied the doctrine.72 Promissory estoppel was held to be applicable,
and the court remanded the case for determination on those grounds.
67. Id. at 873. The court said, "... . the offeree must accept the offer unconditionally.
As stated in Drennan v. Star Paving Co.,
• A general contractor is not free to delay acceptance after he has
been awarded the general contract in the hope of getting a better price.
Nor can he re-open bargaining with the subcontractor and at the same
time claim a continuing right to accept the offer. 333 P.2d at 760.
68. "That doctrine has been applied with increasing frequency and is especially
applicable to the construction industry." 414 P.2d 873.
69. 76 N.M. 729, 418 P.2d 187 (1966).
70. 90 N.J. Super. 69, 216 A.2d 246 (1966).
71. 216 A.2d at 249. See also UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-205.
72. 216 A.2d at 251.
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These cases illustrate that there is a reluctance on the part of most
courts to apply promissory estoppel. However, where the facts and
circumstances required it, the decisions have followed Drennan and
have utilized the doctrine to achieve a just result.73
The underlying rationale for the application of promissory estoppel
is best expressed by Justice Jacobs in Schipper v. Levitt & Sons,74 cited
in the Coronis case:
The law should be based on current concepts of what is right and
just, and the judiciary should be alert to the never-ending need for
keeping its common law principles abreast of the times. Ancient
distinctions which make no sense in today's society and tend to
discredit the law should be readily rejected. 75
It seems, then, that the effort of the Courts should be to seek solutions
that conform to contemporary business practices.
LEGAL REMEDIES
Contract Theory
Unfortunately, strict contract theory has proven inadequate in many
instances as a solution to problems produced by modern business oper-
ations. It is very seldom that a bona fide contract is concluded between
the subcontractor and the general prior to the letting of the overall bid.
Unilateral or option contracts76 rarely arise because one must first
construe the sub's bid as an offer that contemplates acceptance by its
use in the general's bid.77 Such acceptance is usually not intended;78
and even should that be the sub's intent, it is often difficult to determine
if his bid has been used by the general unless the letting party requires
that subcontractors be listed in the general's bid.79 Generals frequently
"doctor" the subs' figures by combining the lowest estimates of several
73. Cf. Southeastern Sales & Service Co. v. T.T.Watson, Inc., 334 S.W.2d 258 (Kan.
1960).
74. 44 N.J. 70, 207 A.2d 314 (1965).
75. Id. at 325.
76. Unilateral contracts are now termed option contracts by REsTATEMNT (SEc-
oN) OF CoNTRtAcrs (Tent. Draft No. 1, 1964).
77. REsATEmENT OF CoNTmacts H 45, 55, 56.
78. 64 F.2d 344.
79. Listing of subcontractors is usually required in U.S. Government contracts, and
a few states also require listing in state contracts. In private contracts, however, while.
the practice varies, listing is not generally required.
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bids. 0 Upon mere examination of the general's figures, no one can de-
termine which sub's offer was used. For this reason, one seldom finds
that a unilateral contract exists in practice. This doctrine of option con-
tracts is not sufficiently flexible to adapt to present modes of operation
in the construction industry.
Bilateral contracts do not satisfactorily resolve the problem, either,
since a bilateral contract requires a return promise to become binding.
Seldom will a general accept a sub's bid prior to the letting of the gen-
eral contract. General contractors have no wish to be bound before
the final contract is let. Therefore, the court is frequently unable to
find that a bilateral contract has indeed been made.81 If the court can
so find, the difficulties are easily resolved, the sub being bound accord-
ing to the terms of the contract.
In the final analysis, unilateral and bilateral contract theory, while
it governs generally the whole spectrum of relationships in the con-
80. For example:
Sub #1 air conditioning equipment $5,000.00
freon & piping 1,000.00
installation 3,000.00
$9,000.00
Sub #2 air conditioning equipment $7,000.00
freon & piping 500.00
installation 1,500.00
$9,000.00
The general might use Sub #1's equipment figure and use Sub #2's installation and
freon figures. Thus, his bid in this area would be $7,000.00 ($5,000.00, $500.00 and
$1,500.00). Moreover, it is not uncommon to find that the subs' individual bids do not
all include the same items. For example:
Sub #1 air conditioning equipment $5,000.00
freon & piping 1,000.00
$6,000.00
Sub #2 air conditioning equipment $5,000.00
installation 2,000.00
$7,000.00
In this event the general must combine the figures to reach a complete bid which
would be as follows:
air conditioning equipment $5,000.00
freon and piping 1,000.00
installation 2,000.00
$8,000.00
81. Contra, JayBe Constr. Co. v. Beco, Inc., 3 Conn. Cir. 406, 216 A.2d 208 (1956);
cf. C. H. Leavell & Co. v. Grafe & Assocs., 90 Idaho 502, 414 P.2d 873 (1966).
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struction industry, does not apply to the sub-general relationship dur-
ing bidding if no formal agreement has been reached by the parties.
Since, as previously discussed, formal agreements at the bidding stage
are the exception rather than the rule, 2 there remains an area of dis-
pute that is not amenable to the usual theories of contract formation.
Promissory Estoppel
The doctrine of promissory estoppel has enabled the courts to re-
solve these disputes and grant relief. A court can view whatever is-
sues are presented and determine in whose favor the equities lie. If the
equities are in favor of the general contractor, the court can invoke
promissory estoppel to create a contract and bind the sub. If the court
finds that a contract exists, it may award damages for the breach there-
of.83 However, should the equities of the case lie in favor of the sub-
•contractor, the court may simply find that promissory estoppel does
not apply and hold that no contract ever existed.8 The value of the
promissory estoppel doctrine therefore lies in its flexibility.
However, while the flexibility of promissory estoppel enables the
adaptation of legal remedies to modem business practices as the equities
demand, it is less than ideal as a guide to the layman contractor whor
seeks a concrete formula by which he can determine his liability. Costly
and time-consuming litigation is necessary to determine the equities be-
tween the parties, and this procedure is detrimental to all concerned.
If he is willing to change some of his business practices, the general
contractor can forestall much of the litigation involving construction
bids. He may require all subcontractors to make offers in writing which
will be held open for a reasonable length of time. If these offers are for
the sale of goods only, they will fall within the provisions of the Uniform
82. Id.
83. See RmATEMENT (SEcoND) OF Co,\-mcTs § 90 (Tent. Draft No. 2, 1965). The
tentative draft has changed this section in some important respects. The Reporter's
Note to this section states,
The principal change from the original RESrATEMENT is the recognition of
the possibility of partial enforcement ... [citations omitted]. Partly be-
cause of that change, the requirement that the action or forbearance have
a 'definite and substantial character' is deleted; and provision is added for
reliance by beneficiaries.
84. Id. A court, under the proposed § 90 may afford partial relief to the general
should the equities require it. "The remedy granted for breach may be limited as
justice requires."
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Commercial Code."' If the bids are for services alone, or for both
goods and services, the Code of course, will not apply.80 Contract law
recognizes firm offers but requires either that they be made under seal87
if they are to be irrevocable for a certain period of time. Thus, firm
offers for goods and services, which are not supported by consideration
or seal, must be accepted prior to the sub's revocation, preferably in
writing; whereas firm offers for goods, which come under Section 2-205
of the Code, since they are held open for a definite period, may be ac-
cepted at any time within that period and still be binding upon the
sub. In any event, it would benefit all parties concerned if the general
were to accept the sub's offer in writing, subject to the award of the
general contract. Such an acceptance cements the relationship and
normally creates a binding bilateral contract.8 The rights of the par-
ties are then fixed, the general being assured of a certain cost for the
subcontractor's work and the sub being assured that he will be paid a
specific sum for his performance.
The general has yet another option; he can require each sub to post
a bid bond as a prerequisite to consideration of the bid. This course of
action has the advantage of guaranteeing damages to the general with-
out the necessity of a suit for breach of contract should the sub with-
draw his offer or otherwise default. From the general's point of view,
the bid bond is perhaps the best solution to the firm offer problem.
But bonds are an expense, and the burden of payment falls initially on
the sub. Since the cost of the bonds diminishes proportionately as the
expense of the project increases, the sub can bury the cost in his bid
where large projects are concerned. But if the project is small, the ex-
pense of the bonds becomes prohibitive in relation to the cost of the
job, and the sub cannot conceal all of the expense in his bid; conse-
quently, he must cut his profit margin. For this reason bid bonds are
no panacea, and their value is limited.
CONCLUSION
The complexity of the firm offer problem is best reflected by the
85. Offers which fall under this section are irrevocable for the time stated or for
a reasonable time, if the period is not specified.
86. Supra note 31.
87. REsTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS 5 § 24, 47. See also RSTATEMENT (SEcoN) OF CoN-
TRACTS §§ 24, 24a (Tent. Draft No. 1, 1964).
88. In addition to the other prerequisites, the offer and acceptance must meet the
requirements of definiteness before a binding contract can be created. See generally
RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS §§ 32, 22 and comments.
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number of possible solutions. No one theory can claim to resolve all
the issues that can be presented. Hallowed contract principles of offer
and acceptance are uncomfortable in the new vistas opened by the busi-
ness practices of the construction industry. Modern codifications, such
as the Uniform Commercial Code, have not aged sufficiently -for their
impact to be determined. The burden of resolving the dilemma falls
squarely upon the equitable doctrine of estoppel. Its flexibility and
common-sense orientation provides courts with a legal peg upon which
to base their decisions. The present trend has been to expand the ap-
plication of promissory estoppel, a trend which is reflected in case
law and in the tentative draft of the Restatement. While the extension
of the doctrine to construction bids has been gradual, its application
is now well-settled in precedent since it offers the best means of balanc-
ing the equities of all parties concerned-the subcontractor, the con-
tractor and the letting party.
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